For decades, the U.S. foreign portfolio share remained relatively constant; yet, from 1994 to 2010, the share of equity wealth U.S. investors allocated to foreign markets nearly doubled. Using a sample of monthly bilateral equity holding between investors in the U.S. and 45 countries, I document that most of the increase occurred from U.S. investors passively allowing their foreign holdings to appreciate. Traditional portfolio choice theories predict that the gains to holding foreign equity are increasing in wealth. Alternative theories of ambiguity aversion and speculative investment predict that uncertainty and misvaluation impact international portfolio choice as well. Controlling for the passive change in the U.S. foreign portfolio share, I find that the portfolio reallocations of U.S. investors are consistent with changes in foreign wealth sending U.S. investors abroad and less so towards markets with higher uncertainty and misvaluation. I show that over this period, U.S. investors sold substantial portions of domestic equity to foreign investors; however, foreign investors in markets where misvaluation was most severe increased their share of the U.S. stock market at a relatively lower rate. _________________________ *e-mail mwynter@uic.edu. I thank my dissertation committee, René Stulz (chair), Kewei Hou, and Ingrid Werner, for helpful discussion and suggestions. I am also grateful for comments from Jack Bao, Brian Baugh, Fousseni Chabi-Yo, and the Ohio State University.
For decades the share of equity wealth that U.S. investors allocated abroad remained relatively flat; however, in recent years, it has grown substantially. In 1994 the U.S. foreign portfolio share was 10.52%, by 2010, it rose to 21.74%. Traditional portfolio choice theories predict that investors limit their foreign holdings when the costs of international diversification outweigh the benefits. Theories of ambiguity aversion (Ellsberg, 1961) and behavioral finance suggest that uncertainty and speculation play important roles in foreign investment as well. While these theories offer different perspectives on why U.S. investors continue to allocate the majority of their equity wealth to domestic stocks (Lewis, 2011) , the increased foreign portfolio share would suggest that through time, this tendency has waned.
Using a sample of monthly bilateral equity holdings between the U.S. and 45 countries from 1994 to 2010, I examine how the U.S. foreign portfolio share has increased. Specifically, I decompose the change in the U.S. foreign portfolio share into the active changes due to the trades of investors and the passive changes due to valuation changes. I find that most of the increase in the foreign portfolio share has been due to passive changes. For my sample, the share of the U.S. stock market capitalization held by foreign investors rose from 5.90% in 1994 to 13.29% in 2010. The increased foreign share of the U.S. stock market indicates that U.S. investors sold sizeable portions of their domestic equity holdings to foreign investors. My results show that the U.S. foreign portfolio share has increased as U.S. investors have passively allowed their foreign holdings to appreciate and actively sold their domestic equity holdings to foreign investors. Consistent with this implication, using monthly bilateral equity flows collected by the U.S. Department of the Treasury International Capital System (TIC), I find that over this period the sum of U.S. net equity flows relative to the U.S. stock market capitalization has been negative.
To understand why the U.S. foreign portfolio share has increased through time, I test whether the cross-country variation in the monthly changes of U.S. investors' foreign equity holdings was consistent with traditional portfolio choice, theories of uncertainty aversion, or speculative investment. Each portfolio choice theory has pricing implications for returns and exchange rates; therefore, I control for the passive change in U.S. investors' foreign equity holdings. First, holding risk aversion constant, traditional portfolio choice theories predict that if maintaining a foreign investment position is costly, the gains to holding foreign equity are increasing in wealth. Second, holding the level of ambiguity aversion constant, theories of portfolio choice under uncertainty predict that the gains to investing abroad are decreasing in aggregate uncertainty (Uppal and Wang, 2003; Epstein, 2001) . Third, behavioral work on international investment suggests that sentiment can influence international capital flows (Baker, Foley, Wurgler, 2009; Hwang, 2009; Baker, Wurgler, Yuan, 2012) . Holding the limits to arbitrage constant, speculative investment predicts a positive relation between market misvaluation and investors allocation to foreign markets.
Empirically, I find that the change in U.S. stock portfolios across countries supports predictions of wealth and ambiguity. I measure changes in financial wealth with market returns. Additionally, I use growth in industrial production to proxy for monthly changes in non-financial wealth. Holding passive changes constant, I find that U.S. portfolio reallocations are positively associated with current and future changes in foreign wealth and not significantly associated with domestic changes in wealth. The total change in the U.S. foreign portfolio share displays a significantly positive relation with current global returns and a negative relation with lagged global returns. In my sample, the relation holds at the target country level and extends to lead growth in a target country's industrial production. Both findings are consistent with Curcuru, Thomas, Warnock, and Wongsman (2010) who find that U.S. investors partially rebalance and tend to sell past winners.
1 Finally, I find that the association between my proxy for increased uncertainty, the ratio of the highest standard deviation of daily market returns for any month in t-3 to t, divided by the monthly minimum of the standard deviation of daily market returns for any month in t-3 to t, and changes in the portfolio weights of U.S investors is negative and economically significant.
The relation is consistent with U.S. investors increasing their foreign portfolio share less towards market where uncertainty grew higher.
The results are less supportive of the predictions of speculative investment causing U.S. investors to increase their foreign portfolio share. To test whether U.S. investors have increased their holdings more towards target markets that experience more severe mispricing, I use the misvaluation component of each target country's market-to-book ratio (Baker, Foley, Wurgler, 2009; Hwang 2009 ). Holdings passive changes constant, I find a significantly negative association between a target market's misvaluation and U.S. investors' portfolio reallocations. U.S. investors reduced their mispriced holdings in equity markets that were more liquid at a higher rate, a result consistent with liquidity easing arbitrage. Lastly, across home countries, I examine the change in foreign investors' relative share of the U.S. equity market. In my sample, a home country's misvaluation component is negatively associated with changes in the relative share of the U.S. stock market, suggesting that foreign investors in markets that experienced higher levels of misvaluation increased their share of the U.S. stock market at relatively lower rates.
This paper relates to an extensive literature that examines why investors are less than perfectly globally diversified 2 and a growing literature on the impact of valuations on international portfolio reallocations (Curcuru et al, 2010 (Curcuru et al, , 2011 . As such, my contribution is three fold. First, identifying equity holdings across target countries allows me to document where U.S. investors went and to disentangle how they got there, i.e. through trades or valuation changes. I show that the economic impact of the passive changes is large and controlling for them is empirically important. Second, monthly data increases the power to distinguish why investors go abroad. My experiments test competing theories of portfolio choice by exploiting cross-country variation in factors that change dynamically. Third, exploiting foreign investors' holdings of U.S. equity across home countries, I categorize which investors changed their share of the U.S. equity market. I show that foreign purchases of U.S. equity were considerable; pinpointing 2 For detailed reviews of the home bias literature, see Lewis (2011) and Karolyi and Stulz (2003) .
which specific countries changed their share of the U.S. equity market permits me to ask who came into the U.S.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and methodology I use to measure flows. Section 3 examines growth in the U.S. foreign portfolio share and foreign holdings of U.S. equity from 1977 to 2011. In section 4, I investigate the relation between changes in stock portfolios and wealth, uncertainty, and misvaluation. I conclude in section 5.
Section 2. Data and Methodology
In the first part of the paper, I describe the data on international portfolio holdings and equity flows. I then turn to the construction of the foreign holdings measures, active and passive changes in foreign holdings, and non-domestic equity flows scaled by holdings.
Equity Holdings Data Sources
To investigate the U.S. reallocation of non-domestic equity holdings, I use two main bilateral databases, the Bertaut and Tryon (2007) Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey).
Measuring Equity Reallocation
I use three measures of equity reallocation: changes in the foreign portfolio share of U.S.
investors total equity wealth, changes in the share of the U.S. stock market capitalization held by foreign investors, and non-domestic equity flows scaled by equity holdings. The foreign portfolio share measures the proportion of total equity wealth investors allocate abroad. The foreign share of the U.S. stock market capitalization measures the portion of total U.S. equity held by foreign residents. The equity flows measure investors' net purchases of non-domestic equity.
To calculate U.S. investors' domestic holdings and total equity wealth, I use a methodology similar to Kho et al. (2009) . I obtain the month-end market U.S. market capitalization from CRSP and the month-end dollar value of foreign holdings of U.S. equity from the Bertaut and Tryon database. To changed the exemption level from US$ 2 million to US$50 million in either gross purchase or gross sales during a month (http://www.newyorkfed.org/banking/regrept/WebpageHistoricReportingChanges_TICS.pdf).U.S. Treasury TIC S Form instructions explain that once the exemption level is exceeded, reporting is required for the remainder of the calendar year regardless of the level of either purchase or sales in subsequent months (http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Documents/sinstr-june2011.pdf).
measure U.S. investors' holdings of domestic equity at time t (US Domestic Holdings t ), I take the capitalization of the U.S. market less the dollar value of foreign holdings of U.S. equity. I define a country in which U.S. investors hold equity as a target country and a country in which foreign investors hold U.S. equity as a home country. To measure U.S. investors' total equity wealth, I add U.S. domestic equity holdings and the total dollar value of their equity holdings for each target country in the sample (US Foreign Holdings j,t ). To measure portfolio weights (US Portfolio Weight j,t ), I scale the dollar value of U.S. foreign equity holdings of each target country by U.S. investors' total equity wealth:
(1)
where US Portfolio Weight j,t is the relative portion of equity wealth U.S. investors allocate to country j at time t. In equation (1), the numerator is the dollar value that U.S. investors hold in target country j at time t and the denominator, the total equity wealth that U.S. investors have at time t, equals the dollar value of domestic equity that U.S. investors hold at time t plus the dollar value of their holdings of all the target countries in the sample at time t. The holdings data for Belgium and New Zealand are available starting in January 2000. The final sample contains 8883 country-month observations. To reduce the potential impact of outliers, I winsorize the portfolio weights at the 1% and 99% level.
I measure the total foreign portfolio share by summing U.S. investors' holding of foreign equity by U.S. total portfolio wealth:
where US Foreign Portfolio Share t is the total dollar value of equity wealth that U.S. investors allocate to all the target countries in the sample at time t, the denominator is previously defined.
Measuring Passive Benchmark Reallocation
Each month I estimate a passive benchmark of the total equity wealth and portfolio weights based on the monthly price and exchange rate changes for the target countries. To measure the passive asset allocation benchmark, I estimate the implied value of U.S. equity holdings of target country j's equity at time t (Implied Holding j,t ) as a function of target country j's price appreciation (R j,t ) and exchange rate changes (S j,t ):
where Implied Holding j,t is the passive benchmark's dollar value of U.S. investors' holdings of target country j's equity at time t, R j,t is the monthly return of target country j from t-1 to t in U.S. dollars, and (4) where US Passive Portfolio Weight (P,Fx) j,t is the relative amount of equity wealth U.S. investors would have allocated to country j at time t had they passively held their foreign equity from time t-1 to time t, Implied Holding j,t is previously defined and the denominator is the passive benchmark's total equity wealth that U.S. investors have at time t. The difference between the denominator of Equation (1) and Equation (4) is the denominator's second term, the dollar value of U.S. investors' implied equity holdings of all target countries in the sample. The implied holdings terms adjusts total portfolio wealth for investors passively holding their non-domestic equity portfolio from time t-1 to time t.
10 As before, I
winsorize the passive level of the portfolio weights at the 1% and 99% level.
To measure the passive benchmark of the total foreign portfolio share, I normalize the sum of investors' implied holdings of foreign equity by implied total portfolio wealth:
where US Passive Foreign Portfolio Share (P,Fx) i,t is the total dollar value of equity wealth U.S. investors 10 My methodology to calculate passive changes in the foreign portfolio share differs from the approach used in Curcuru et al. (2011) , which applies buy and hold returns to the domestic holdings term to measure what they define as U.S. investors' global portfolio.
would have allocated to all target countries in the sample at time t had they passively held their foreign equity from time t-1 to time t, and the denominator, U.S. investors' passive level of total equity wealth at time t, was defined previously.
Measuring Active Equity Allocation
To determine if U.S. investors actively reallocate their holdings, I estimate the changes in the U.S. portfolio weights that is not due to price changes and exchange rates:
To assess whether U.S. investors actively reallocate their total foreign portfolio share, I contrast the first difference in U.S. investors' total foreign portfolio share with the first difference implied by the passive benchmark:
Measuring Foreign Investors' Share of U.S. Equity
To examine the share of the U.S. stock market held by foreign investors, I normalize the dollar value of U.S. equity held by residents in home country j at time t by the U.S. stock market capitalization:
As before, I winsorize the foreign share of the U.S. stock market weights at the 1% and 99% level. To measure the extent to which investors in home country j change their relative share of the U.S. stock market at time t, I take the change in home country j's foreign share of the U.S. stock market from time t-1 to time t.
Measuring Portfolio Flows
I use three measures of bilateral equity flows: outflows, inflows, and net flows. Outflows measure the net amount of foreign equity purchased by U.S. residents. Inflows measure foreign residents' net purchases of U.S. equity. Net flows measure the netted portfolio flow between U.S. and foreign investors by taking the difference between outflows and inflows. To keep the economic interpretation of the equity flows comparable to the U.S. foreign portfolio share and the foreign share of the U.S. stock market, I
scale outflows by U.S. investors' lagged holdings of total equity and normalize inflows and net flows by the U.S. stock market capitalization. I detail this below.
To measure non-domestic equity transactions for each country, I follow a methodology similar to Vagias and van Dijk (2010) and Forbes and Warnock (2011) . I calculate outflows (Outflow j,t ) as U.S.
investors' total purchases of target country j's equity at time t (US Purchases Foreign Equity j,t ) less U.S.
investors' total sales of target country j's equity at time t (US Sales Foreign Equity j,t ), scaled by the lagged dollar value of U.S. investors' total portfolio wealth:
To measure inflows (Inflow j,t ) relative to the U.S. stock market capitalization, I take the difference between investors' in home country j's total purchases of U.S. equity at time t (Foreign Purchases US Equity j, ) and total sales of U.S. equity at time t (Foreign Sales US Equity t ), scaled by the U.S. stock market capitalization:
I compute net flows (Net flow j,t ) relative to the U.S. stock market capitalization, as U.S.
investors' outflow to target country j at time t (Outflow j,t ) minus U.S. inflow from investors' in home country j at time t (Inflow j,t ), scaled by the U.S. stock market capitalization:
Section 3. How did the U.S. foreign portfolio share grow?
In this section, I use the three measures of foreign equity allocation defined in Section 2 to document the growth in U.S. investors' portfolio share from 1994 to 2010. To account for potential small sample bias, all standard errors are bootstrapped. Table 1 presents statistics on the level and monthly change in U.S. bilateral equity holdings over the sample period. For the target countries in the sample, I find that the relative share of U.S. equity wealth allocated abroad has increased by an average of 0.001% per month (Column 3). The average monthly change in portfolio weights has been significantly positive for both developed (0.002%) and emerging markets (0.001%). When I sum the monthly portfolio weight changes over the sample period, I
Changes in U.S. Portfolio Weights and the Foreign Share of U.S. Equity
find that the accumulated impact is large. The U.S. foreign portfolio share more than doubled over the sample period, growing by 10.721 percentage points. U.S. holdings in developed markets accounted for roughly four fifths of that increase. Column (4) reveals that had investors made no monthly trades, the average change in the U.S. foreign portfolio share would have been roughly the same. Column (5) When I examine foreign holdings of U.S. equity, I find that the average monthly change in the percentage of the U.S. stock market capitalization held by foreign investors has been significantly positive (Column 8). The summed monthly changes in the foreign share of the U.S. stock market capitalization indicate that investors in developed home countries acquired U.S. equity at a higher rate (6.03%) than investors in emerging home countries (1.18%). The results are consistent with investors in developed countries tending to allocate more wealth abroad (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2008) . The overall increase in the percentage of the U.S. stock market held by foreign investors suggests that over the sample period, U.S. investors sold a substantial portion of their domestic equity holdings to foreign investors.
The share of U.S. equity wealth invested abroad did not rise in all target countries; U.S. portfolio weights decreased in Italy, the Netherlands, Argentina, Malaysia, and Mexico over the sample period.
Interestingly, had U.S. investors not made monthly trades, U.S. investors' total allocation to those target countries still would have decreased. The results reiterate the previous findings that changes in the U.S.
foreign portfolio share were largely driven by passive changes. Also of note, not all foreign investors increased their relative share of the U.S. equity market; the percentage of the U.S. stock market held abroad decreased in roughly one-fifth of the countries in the sample. Three were developed (Austria, Belgium, and Italy) and seven were emerging (Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Morocco, Pakistan, Philippines, and Turkey). The findings highlight the extent to which investors in developed home countries acquired increased shares of the U.S. stock market at higher rates than investors in emerging home countries. Table 2 reports the mean and sum of monthly bilateral equity flows between investors in the U.S.
U.S. Equity Cross Border Equity Flows
and investors in the countries in the sample. The results are generally consistent with the previous finding that, U.S. investors' allocation to developed markets grew at a larger rate than U.S. allocation to emerging markets. Column (2) shows that, in total, U.S. investors' net purchases of foreign equity relative to their total portfolio wealth increased by 6.335% over the sample period. It increased by more in developed target countries (4.990%) than it did in emerging target countries (1.344%). Column (4) reports inflow scaled by the U.S. stock market capitalization. As before, in developed home countries investors acquired U.S. equity at relatively higher rate (7.950%) than investors in emerging home countries (0.206%).
Column (6) shows that relative to the U.S. stock market capitalization, the total net flow over the sample period was -1.659%. This indicates that U.S. investors went abroad at a lower rate than non-U.S.
investors entered into the U.S. stock market. Relative to the U.S. stock market capitalization, the total net flow between the U.S. and developed markets was negative (-2.832%) and positive between the U.S. and emerging markets (1.173%). In other words, the results indicate that the sales of domestic equity to foreign investors were largely driven by U.S. investors selling their domestic holdings to investors in developed countries.
Section 4. Why did U.S. investors increase their foreign portfolio share?
In this section, I examine whether the cross-country variation in allocation was consistent with traditional theories of portfolio choice, portfolio choice under uncertainty, or theories of speculative investment.
Did changes in wealth cause investors to increase their foreign portfolio share?
In this section, I investigate the relation between changes in wealth and changes in foreign equity holdings. Holding the level of risk aversion and the costs associated with investing abroad fixed, the gains from holding foreign equity will be an increasing function of wealth (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2008 ).
Additionally, gains and losses in non-financial wealth can lead investors to reallocate their stocks portfolios (Heaton and Lucas, 2000) . All else equal, the wealth theory predicts a positive relation between changes in wealth and foreign investment.
To test the wealth hypothesis, I estimate a time-series OLS regression using the monthly total change in the U.S. foreign portfolio share over the sample period. The passive changes in the foreign portfolio share would be directly impacted if changes in wealth change the net benefit of holding foreign equity. Active increases in the foreign portfolio share require investors to purchase foreign equity; therefore, active change will directly affect investors' total wealth. Consequently, an investor who needs to sell foreign equity to cover a loss of income or to diversify following an increase in non-financial wealth will reallocate through an active change.
The independent variables are proxies for changes in financial and non-financial wealth. I measure aggregate changes in financial wealth with current and lagged monthly U.S. stock market returns. Though investors are not perfectly globally diversified, they hold wealth abroad; hence, negative domestic or foreign returns would constitute a loss of wealth. To proxy for global changes in financial wealth, I use current and lagged monthly non-U.S. global stock market returns form the MSCI World Index, downloaded via DataStream. To account for the correlation between U.S. and foreign returns, I
follow Bekaert et al. (2011) and orthogonalize current global returns to contemporaneous and past U.S.
returns. 11 The ideal proxy for changes in non-financial wealth would be monthly changes in real GDP growth; however, GDP growth is not available at a monthly frequency. Therefore, I use monthly growth in U.S. industrial production. 12 Industrial production is provided by the U.S. Federal Reserve Board and downloaded from Jeffery Wurgler's website. Because investors may slowly respond to change in nonfinancial wealth, I measure the change in industrial production from time t-3 to time t. Alternatively, investors may reallocate their portfolio holdings in anticipation of changes of non-financial wealth. To test whether future changes in non-financial income are associated with current changes in foreign investment, I also use the change in industrial production from time t to time t+3. Because the wealth 11 The main findings in this section are not sensitive the use of orthogonal returns. 12 Hobijn and Steindel (2009) show that from 1948 to 2009, the correlation between quarterly U.S. real GDP growth and U.S. industrial production is 0.8. For a detailed discussion on the high frequency relation between U.S. real GDP growth and industrial production see their paper and the citations there in. http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues/ci15-7.pdf hypothesis predicts that both the passive and active change in the foreign portfolio share will be impacted by changes in wealth, I include current and lagged passive changes in the foreign portfolio share. Within this specification, the wealth hypothesis predicts that the estimated coefficient on the wealth measures and the passive changes will be positive. To account for potential small sample bias and seasonality, all standard errors are clustered by month and bootstrapped within each cluster. Table 3 Panel A reports the results for the time-series regressions. Regressions (1) through (4) examine the total change in the U.S. foreign portfolio share. Regression (1) includes both U.S. market returns and passive changes in the foreign portfolio share in the estimation. The estimated coefficients on U.S. market returns are not significantly different from zero. The estimated coefficients on the current and lagged passive changes in the foreign portfolio share are significantly positive, indicating that a passive increase in equity wealth is associated with an increase in the foreign portfolio share. The coefficients on the passive changes imply that when the foreign portfolio share increases by 1 percentage point this month, U.S. investors increase their foreign portfolio share by 0.6045 percentage points that same month and by 0.1290 percentage points the following month. Repeating specification (1) with global returns and passive changes, Regression (2) shows the estimated coefficient on contemporaneous global returns is significantly positive and the estimated coefficient on lagged global returns is significantly negative. The results suggest that U.S. investors positively respond to current changes in foreign financial wealth and negatively respond to past global market returns. Regression (3) replaces global returns with lag and lead changes in industrial production. I do not find the estimated coefficients on the industrial production terms to be distinguishable from zero.
13 Regression (4) includes all three proxies for changes in wealth and passive changes. Both the estimated coefficients on the global returns and passive terms remain statistically and economically significant. I do not find that the estimated coefficients on either the U.S.
return or industrial production terms are significantly different from zero. 14 The total foreign portfolio share results suggest that changes in wealth, specifically financial wealth abroad, are significantly associated with changes in U.S. investors' allocation to foreign markets.
The findings documented in Section (3) highlighted the economic importance of U.S. investors' sales of domestic equity to foreign investors. To understand whether these sales of domestic equity were related to changes in wealth, I turn to the changes in the aggregate share of the U.S. stock market held by foreign investors. The predictions of the wealth theory and changes in the level of foreign holdings of U.S. equity are not quite clear. If it is more costly to maintain a foreign investment position abroad than at home (Lane and Milessi-Ferritti, 2008; Black, 1976; Stulz, 1984) , then when wealth falls investors can reallocate away from foreign markets by buying domestic stocks. This predicts that when U.S. investors lose wealth, the share of the U.S. stock market held by foreign investors also falls. Alternatively, U.S.
investors may sell domestic equity to foreign investors to cover income loses. If U.S. investors sell domestic holdings to accommodate for wealth losses, then when wealth falls, the foreign share of the U.S.
stock market should rise. To examine the relation empirically, I regress monthly changes in the total foreign share of the U.S. stock market on the wealth proxies described previously. To account for the possibility that U.S. investors may slowly unwind their domestic holdings for reason unrelated to wealth, I augment the specifications estimated in Models (1) through (4) with the lagged changes the foreign share of the U.S. market.
Regressions (5) through (8) The results presented in Table 3 Panel A show a significantly positive (negative) association between current (lagged) foreign returns and current changes in the total foreign portfolio share of U.S.
investors. The results also suggest that passive changes in the U.S. foreign portfolio share are positively related to changes in the total share of the U.S. market held by foreign investors. Panel B of Table 3 explores these relationships at the country-level. Specifically, I estimate panel regressions of the monthly changes of U.S. investor's portfolio weights at the target-country level and foreign investors' shares of the U.S. stock market at the home-country level. A concern with country-level data is that the changes in the portfolio-weights may be noisy. The benefit is that it allows a way to exploit the cross-country variation for the sample of 45 countries. Furthermore, the panel data is helpful in terms of focusing on the portfolio-level mechanisms that impact foreign reallocation. I follow the same approach I used in Panel A of Table 3 (1) includes foreign returns and passive changes. As before, I follow Bekaert et al. (2011) and orthogonalize each country's return to current and lagged U.S. returns. I find that the previous findings for the positive relation with current returns and the negative relation with lagged returns hold at the target country level.
The estimated coefficients on both terms remain economically and statistically significant. The estimated coefficients on the current and lagged passive changes are positive and significant, a result consistent with investors passively increasing their allocation to target markets given changes in wealth. Regression (2) replaces returns with growth in monthly seasonally adjusted industrial production, obtained from the IMF. A significantly positive relation between lagged foreign returns and current reallocation has been interpreted as evidence of signals of future return performance (Brennan and Cao, 1997; Dahlquist and Robertson, 2004) , performance extrapolation (Griffin, Nadari, and Stulz, 2004) , or evidence of a difference of opinion (Dumas, Lewis, and Osambela, 2011) . To this extent, orthogonal returns may not be representative of the actual signal that investors observe when deciding whether to reallocate their wealth abroad. In unreported robustness checks, I repeat all the models estimated in Table 3 with foreign returns that are not orthogonal to current and lagged U.S. returns. I find that the results remain statistically and economically significant.
The results from Table 3 support three key predictions of the wealth hypothesis. First, the change in the U.S. foreign portfolio share is positively associated with contemporaneous foreign returns. Second, changes in U.S. portfolio weights display a positive relation with a target country's current return and future industrial production growth. Finally, I find that changes in U.S. portfolio weights are negatively associated with changes in a target country's dividend yield. I take this result as behavior consistent with U.S. investors reducing their allocation to foreign markets in response to bad economic news. However, changes in U.S. investors' portfolio weights display a negative association with past foreign market returns.
Did changes in uncertainty cause investors to increase their foreign portfolio share?
In this section, I examine whether the growth in the U.S. foreign portfolio share was consistent with ambiguity averse investors increasing their allocation to foreign markets. Ambiguity averse investors prefer lotteries with outcomes that are certain over lotteries with outcomes that are uncertain (Ellsberg, 1961) . Within the context of global investment, if investors are ambiguity averse, the uncertainty of a foreign country's return process can impact the portion of wealth investors choose to allocate abroad (Uppal and Wang, 2003; Epstein, 2001) . Holding the level of ambiguity aversion constant, the ambiguity aversion hypothesis predicts that investors increase their allocation less in target countries where uncertainty is higher.
I test the uncertainty hypothesis at the target country level by regressing changes in the portfolio weights of U.S. investors on proxies for uncertainty. While a common measure for the change in uncertainty is the Chicago Board Options and Exchange (CBOE) VIX index (Giannetti and Laeven, 2012; Forbes and Warnock, 2011) ; the VIX is not available for my sample of countries. To proxy for the uncertainty of a target country's return distribution, I take the ratio of the highest standard deviation of daily market returns for any month t-3 to month t, divided by the monthly minimum of the standard deviation of daily market returns for any month t-3 to month t. In untabulated results, I find the sample average of the maximum volatility ratio nearly doubles from Q3 2008 to Q4 2008 and dramatically falls in 2009. As before, I control for the current and lagged passive change in U.S. portfolio weights. If investors are ambiguity averse, the passive changes should reflect the impact of changes in uncertainty on market returns and exchange rates. In this specification, the ambiguity aversion hypothesis predicts that the coefficient on the maximum volatility ratio is to be negative. As before, all specifications include country and monthly fixed effects; standard errors are clustered by target country and bootstrapped within each cluster. Table 4 presents the results. Regression (1) includes the maximum volatility ratio and the current and lagged passive change in U.S. portfolio weights. Consistent with the predictions of the ambiguity aversion hypothesis, the coefficient on the maximum volatility ratio is significantly negative. The coefficient implies that, all else equal, when a target country's maximum volatility ratio increases by 1 percentage point, U.S. investors reduce their portfolio weights by 0.0015 percentage points that same month. The results imply that over the sample period, U.S. investors increase their allocation less towards markets with relatively higher uncertainty. This result supports the ambiguity aversion hypothesis.
Alternatively, the significantly negative relation between the maximum volatility ratio and changes in U.S. portfolio weights may be due to the maximum volatility ratio capturing risk and not uncertainty. To investigate whether the significantly negative association is driven by risk, I use the monthly average of the standard deviation of daily market returns over a rolling 3-month span. When I include the average standard deviation into specification (1), Regression (2) shows the estimated coefficient on the volatility ratio remains significantly negative and relatively unchanged from the previous specification. An alternative measure of risk is the range (Garman and Klass, 1980; Alizadeh, Brandt, and Diebold, 2002) . Regression (3) replaces the standard deviation with range of monthly market returns over a rolling 3-month span. The coefficient on the maximum volatility ratio remains significant and relatively unchanged. The finding suggests that the negative relation between the proxy for uncertainty and U.S. investors' reallocations is not driven by the ratio measuring risk.
One concern may be the sensitivity of the association between uncertainty and changes in the U.S. portfolio weights to the specification of the volatility ratio. Regression (4) switches the volatility ratio's denominator, the monthly minimum volatility of daily market returns, with the monthly average volatility of daily market returns over a rolling 3-month span. I find that the relation between uncertainty and changes in the U.S. portfolio weights remains significantly negative. The proxy for uncertainty suggests that U.S. investors increased their allocations less towards markets where uncertainty was relatively higher and supports the ambiguity aversion hypothesis.
Regressions (5) through (8) examine monthly changes in each home country's share of the U.S. stock market. As before, I augment the previous specifications with the lagged change in each country's share of the U.S. stock market. When I repeat the experiment across home countries, I do not find that the maximum volatility ratio is significantly associated with changes in foreign investors' holdings of U.S.
equity. These results contrast the previous findings and suggest that across home countries, changes in foreign investors' share of the U.S. stock market are not associated with uncertainty in their local market.
To examine the sensitivity of the findings that changes in the U.S. portfolio weights have a significantly negative association with a target country's maximum volatility ratio, I perform unreported robustness checks based on Regression (4). The maximum volatility ratio results may be driven by my choice to restrict the window over which returns are observed to 3-months. However, when I expand the window from 3-month to 6-months, the relation between the maximum volatility ratio and U.S. investors' portfolio weight changes remains significantly negative and economically comparable. Alternatively, the maximum volatility ratio may proxy for emerging markets, which tend to be more volatile and as shown in Section (3), experienced relatively less growth in the total equity portfolio of U.S. investors. Contrary to this prediction, I find that the significantly negative relation holds when I estimate the model separately for both developed and emerging target countries. Overall, these findings support the ambiguity aversion hypothesis.
The results presented in Table 4 generally support the ambiguity aversion hypothesis. I find that the association between the maximum volatility ratio, my proxy for the distribution uncertainty of a foreign return process, and changes in U.S. investors' portfolio allocations is significantly negative. First, the results show that across target countries, U.S. investors reduced their allocation to markets with relatively higher levels of uncertainty. Second, the significantly negative association is not subsumed by a target country's volatility or return range. I take this as evidence consistent with the volatility ratio measuring uncertainty and not risk. Lastly, I do not find that the negative relation holds for changes in foreign investors' shares of the U.S. market. This suggests that at the home country-level, changes in foreign investors' share of the U.S. stock market are not associated local market uncertainty.
Did speculative investment cause investors to increase their foreign portfolio share?
International behavioral work suggests that sentiment may influence international capital flows (Baker, Foley, Wurgler, 2009; Hwang, 2009; Baker, Wurgler, Yuan, 2012) . Speculative investment predicts that noise traders may speculate on foreign markets. If local misvaluation attracts foreign speculation, then holding the limits to arbitrage constant, the speculative investment theory predicts a positive relation between market misvaluation and investors allocation to foreign markets.
I test the speculation hypothesis at the target country level by regressing changes in the portfolio weights of U.S. investors on a proxy for market misvaluation. To proxy for mispricing I use the Baker, Because mispricing can cause 'overvalued' assets to appreciate prior to returning to their fundamental values, an increase in the share of equity wealth allocated to a mispriced-market does not necessarily imply speculative investment. 17 In other words, passive changes can make it seem like investors speculate even if they do not. Therefore, I control for current and lagged passive changes. Within this specification, the speculation theory predicts the estimated coefficients on the misvaluation proxy will be positive if investors increase their allocations to misvalued markets beyond what can be attributed to passive changes. If equity reallocations are not significantly associated with misvaluation, the estimated coefficient should not be distinguishable from zero. Lastly, if investors reduce their allocation to markets when misvaluation is more severe, the estimated coefficient should be significantly negative. As before, I
include monthly fixed effects and target country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by target country and bootstrapped within each cluster. Table 5 If illiquidity makes arbitrage costly, then a target markets' liquidity may impact the extent to which investors are able to react to mispricing. I test the relation between the proxy for mispricing and a target country's liquidity by adding foreign turnover and it's interaction with the misvaluation component (Regression 4). As before, turnover is demeaned at the target-country level using a rolling twelve month window. The estimated coefficient on the misvaluation component remains economically large and significantly negative. The interaction between the misvaluation component and a target country's turnover produces a significantly negative estimated coefficient. The result is consistent with a target country's liquidity easing investors' ability to actively rebalance their portfolios away from markets with higher mispricing, conditional on investors encountering misvaluation in their equity allocations. These results do not generally support the hypothesis that over the sample period, U.S. investors actively reallocated their equity wealth towards markets where misvaluation was more severe.
At the home country level, I examine changes in foreign investors' shares of the U.S. stock market in Regressions (5) (6) through (8) show that the significantly negative association is not subsumed by lagged local returns, changes in the dividend yield, or demeaned home-market turnover interacted with misvaluation. The results suggest that investors in markets that experience higher levels of misvaluation increase their share of the U.S. equity market at a relatively lower rate. Table 5 shows that the misvaluation component of the market-to-book ratio has a significantly negative relation with U.S. investors' reallocations to foreign markets. The relation appears consistent with U.S. investors increasing their portfolio weights at lower rates to markets where misvaluation is more severe. Using monthly turnover, I find evidence consistent with a target market's liquidity easing U.S. investors' reallocation away from markets with higher degrees of misvaluation. Lastly, across home countries, I find a significantly negative relation between the misvaluation component of the market-tobook ratio and foreign changes in the share U.S. the stock market. This finding suggests that foreign investors in markets that experience higher levels of misvaluation increased their holdings of U.S. equity at relatively lower rates.
Section 5. Conclusion
In this paper, I document that from 1994 to 2010, on average the share of equity wealth that U.S.
investors allocated to foreign equity increased. The accumulated change resulted in the U.S. foreign portfolio share nearly doubling over this time span. Separating the monthly change in the U.S. foreign portfolio share into the change due to trades and the change caused by valuation changes, I find that most of this increase has been due to passive changes in the foreign portfolio share. On average, across a sample of 45 target countries, the monthly active changes are not distinguishable from zero. Over this period, U.S. investors significantly reduced their share of the U.S. equity market. For my sample, I find that the passive appreciation of the foreign portfolio share and reduced share of domestic holdings have combined to increase the relative share of equity wealth U.S. investors allocated to foreign markets.
After showing the impact of passive changes on the U.S. foreign portfolio share, I examine whether theories of traditional portfolio choice, uncertainty, or speculation can help explain U.S. portfolio reallocations through time. For the traditional portfolio choice theory, I test whether the portfolio reallocations were significantly associated with changes in wealth. In my sample, current and future changes in foreign wealth are associated with U.S. portfolio reallocations. I find evidence that U.S.
portfolio reallocations are negatively associated with past changes in foreign wealth. A growing literature in uncertainty aversion predicts that uncertainty can limit foreign investment. I find supportive evidence that U.S. investors increased their foreign portfolio share less towards markets where uncertainty increased. Behavioral portfolio choice literature suggests that foreign investment can be speculative.
Using a proxy for market misvaluation, I find the relation between foreign misvaluation and U.S.
portfolio reallocations is significantly negative. I also find a significantly negative relation between foreign misvaluation and changes in foreign investors share of the U.S. equity market. Bertaut and Tryon (2007) database. Max/Min Volatility is the ratio of the highest standard deviation of daily returns for any month from t-3 to t, divided by the minimum standard deviation of daily returns from any month t-3 to t. Max/Avg Volatility is the ratio of the highest standard deviation of daily returns for any month from t to t-3, divided by the monthly average standard deviation of daily returns from month t-3 to t. Avg Volatility is the monthly average standard deviation of daily returns from month t-3 to t. Return Max -Min is the range of the monthly returns for from t-3 to t. For Share and Passive changes are previously defined. All standard errors are clustered by home country and bootstrapped within each cluster. *, **, *** indicate the statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) MarketToBookFitted is the misvaluation component of the country-level market-to-book ratio. The misvaluation component is the fitted value from a first stage regression of future six-month-market returns on country-level market-to-book ratio (Baker, Foley, Wurgler, 2009) . Monthly market-to-book ratios are obtained from DataStream. Return, DivYield, Turnover, For Share and Passive changes are previously defined. All standard errors are clustered by home country and bootstrapped within each cluster. *, **, *** indicate the statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
